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Research School, and head of the Higher Education Policy Research Unit, Dublin
Institute of Technology, Ireland. E-mail: Ellen.hazelkorn@dit.ie. This article is based on
Rankings and the Reshaping of Higher Education. The Battle for World-Class Excellence,
published

by

Palgrave

MacMillan,

2011.

(http://www.palgrave.com/products/title.aspx?pid=391266).

Much of the debate around rankings has focused on methodological problems—which
indicators and weightings, the credibility of the statistical process, and why (or why
not) inconsistencies arise. There are also complaints about the overreliance on research
rather than teaching. Yet, there has been little commentary about the increasing use of
quantitative methodologies to drive decision making at the national or institutional
level—what I call policymaking by numbers. The same issues arise about performance
indicators, in general.
Have rankings accelerated this trend? And, because indicators incentivize
behavior, are we measuring what counts or are we doing what gets measured—a classic
case of “goal displacement”?

1

SELECTIVITY
Student-entry levels are generally considered a good indicator for student achievement,
on the assumption that a student’s performance is roughly similar throughout their
higher education career. For example, US Scholastic Achievement Test scores correlate
strongly with graduation and retention rates, future incomes, and graduate school
admissions. Other higher education systems and institutions use college-entry scores,
preparatory examinations, or secondary school scores for the same reason.
This practice is reinforced by university rankings, such as US News & World Report
and the Times Higher Education World University Rankings, which use student entry
scores as a proxy for educational quality—worth 15 percent and 9.5 percent,
respectively. The greater the number of smart students are admitted, the higher a
university can score. High-ability and second-generation students—the latter from
Asian backgrounds (or non-US citizens)—wanting a doctoral, medical, or law degree
are especially sensitive to rankings. A virtuous circle is created due to the link between
rankings, reputation, and selectivity.
Selectivity is becoming a perverse driver of higher education and student
behavior. Universities seek to improve their rank by a range of enrollment management
practices—including influencing the number of applications received, while retaining
the same number of available places. In this way, the selectivity index rises. Higher
education institutions may limit class or cohort size. They may also use higher tuition
fees to signal selectivity; that the majority of UK universities have chosen the maximum
£9,000 (US$14,700) tuition fee is symptomatic of this mind-set. Others use financial aid
to attract high-calibre students rather than students with the greatest need. Like many
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US universities, the UK government has encouraged universities to offer “special deals”
to high achievers.

COMPLETION RATES
Today, policy is concerned not just with the number of students who enter an
institution but the number who actually complete and graduate within a determined
time frame. In this way, responsibility shifts to the institution to ensure that students
progress successfully through the system. US News & World Report and the European
Union’s new U-Multirank measure an institution’s predictive graduation rate; the latter
also measures graduate (un)employability. This aspect is often captured by surveys of
employer groups, such as those conducted by QS World University Rankings.
However, performance is influenced by many factors, including student
socioeconomic profile. Measuring graduation rates may be disadvantageous to lower
socioeconomic and ethnically disadvantaged groups or mature students, whose life or
family circumstances disturb normal study; while measuring graduation rates can
encourage institutions to abandon educational standards.
This may undermine institutions that are working hard to provide widening
participation opportunities to new student groups or to students who might use this
opportunity to transfer to higher-ranked or other universities. There is already evidence
that institutions are abandoning programs aimed at widening access or establishing
arms-length colleges, so that the poorer-performance scores do not affect the
university’s overall ranking. Others, as mentioned above, are changing the conditions of
their scholarships.
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A major handicap for first destination employment data is the time frame; surveys
usually concentrate on the first six to nine months postgraduation, which is inadequate
for many types of careers and is unable to distinguish between employment on
graduate-level jobs or underemployed. While the time frame may provide useful
information during a period of active economic growth, is the information an accurate
reflection of educational quality during a recession such as the current one?

MEASURING RESEARCH
Measuring research productivity and impact through bibliometric and citation data is a
widespread methodology for assessing academic and research quality and is a key
indicator for various rankings. A related practice is ranking journals, whereby the
quality of a journal is determined by its local, national, or worldwide scientific reach.
The Shanghai Academic Ranking of World Universities awards 20 percent of its score to
just two publications, Science and Nature; and SCImago uses the journals’ scientific
prestige, the SJR indicator, to rank journals based on citations.
Quantity is correlated with quality—despite normalization for discipline,
institution size, and age. This tends to reward larger and older universities and the
physical, life, and medical sciences—due to their publishing habits. This means other
important sources or publication formats—such as, books and conference proceedings,
contribution to international standards or policy reports, electronic formats or open
source publications, etc.—are all ignored. Nationally relevant, interdisciplinary, but
non-English-language research is under-reported and undervalued.
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Many governments, research agencies, and institutions link this exercise to
resource allocation. Not surprisingly, these trends are already producing distortions in
research focus and research management: encouraging academics to write journal
articles rather than reflective books or policy papers, discouraging intellectual risk
taking—favoring the “hard sciences” over the arts, humanities or social sciences, and
informing hiring and firing.

LESSONS
These brief examples raise questions about the way in which indicators can shape
policy decisions and incentivize behavior. Indeed, there is mounting evidence that
governments and higher education institutions around the world are using rankings
deliberately in this way, rolling them into key performance indicators, to inform targets
and award results. In other instances, governments are making profound structural
changes to their national systems in order to push a few elite universities into the top
20, 50, or 100 of global rankings.
The history of rankings shows measuring the wrong things can produce
distortions. The US National Governors Association Center for Best Practice similarly
cautioned in 2009 against relying on methodologies that can inadvertently create
perverse incentives. This should be a critical lesson for all governments and institutions.
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